Texas Supreme Court limits disability definition

A recent case from the Texas Supreme Court circumscribed the definition of “disability” in the Texas Labor Code Section 21.002(6). Read on.

Argument

Sheri Kowalski worked as the director of finance at a hospital in Dallas. She was terminated in a reduction in force (RIF) but claimed the true reason for her termination was her disability.

Kowalski asserted she suffered from “severe” neck pain, “causing her difficulty when driving, typing at a computer for long periods of time, turning her head or turning around, sleeping, and focusing and concentrating.”

Supreme court’s response

The court was direct—“mere difficulty” with everyday tasks is a far cry from what Section 21.002(6) requires, which is evidence of a significant limitation of a major life activity. (Lawyers love using the word “mere” as a modifier in advocating their position.)

Here is the court expounding:

Kowalski does not allege now, and no evidence from her time at [the hospital] indicates, that she was actually unable to complete (that is, that she was in any way limited as to) any of the tasks or activities that she describes.

There’s more! The court said there was no evidence that the hospital was aware of the alleged severity of Kowalski’s condition before letting her go.

From the top rope